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INTRODUCTION
At the junction of the medical sciences, public health,
economics, political science, business and law lies a
fascinating crisis facing much of the developing areas
of the world.  The question of providing access to
essential medications for the third world is a complex
one and faces many barriers to a solution.  Diseases like
AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis have been ravaging the
developing world for decades; despite the efforts of
NGO's, governments, health professionals, lawyers and
even major pharmaceutical companies, a solution to
these problems is nowhere in sight.  
Socio-political factors play an important role in the
rampant spread of disease in underdeveloped nations.
The scarcity of basic infrastructure in developing
nations, such as roads and transportation for access to
hospitals, the neglect of the typically substantial rural
population and basic sanitation to prevent the spread of
disease, are all concerns that must be addressed to quell
the public health crises facing these countries.
Government instability, corruption and inefficiency are
factors that exacerbate the situation (1).
Scientific and medical problems are an added burden
on developing nations.  Cures for some of the most
devastating diseases such as AIDS and malaria are
unavailable.  Prevention strategies are falling on deaf
ears due to time-honored views and social stigma.  With
a few exceptions, inadequate education of the public
serves to perpetuate these counter-productive notions.
The lack of health care professionals to administer
sophisticated drug regimens and ensure proper
compliance with prescriptions is a further challenge (2).  
The commercial side of this issue cannot be ignored.
Pharmaceutical companies are just that, they are
commercial entities and as such have a profit motive.
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SUMMARY
The World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) of 1994 seeks to implement a uniform set of intellectual property protection
across member nations to provide greater stability in international economic relations.  Critics argue
that the TRIPS agreement provides unnecessarily strong protection of intellectual property rights
which serves to prevent the ill in developing nations from having access to affordable essential
medications.
The first recommendation that this paper makes is to provide two sets of intellectual property
protection, one that applies to essential medications such as AIDS drugs and certain antibiotics and
another that applies to drugs that treat non-life threatening conditions.
The second recommendation builds upon the first recommendation: if two sets of intellectual
property protection legislation are enacted, patents on essential medications should be restricted to
patents on processes rather than the product itself.
The third recommendation seeks to amend the language of the TRIPS agreement to make it
obligatory for member nations to implement provisions on compulsory licensing within their domestic
legislation.153 2006
1 "First-movers advantage" is a fundamental commercial principle
that states that the first company to fill a market segment enjoys a
significant competitive advantage over future competition
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Although the ethics of their position can be endlessly
argued, they view their primary responsibility to be
towards their shareholders and investors.
Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry has
concentrated their research and development efforts in
areas that are likely to be profitable, such as drugs for
conditions prevalent in developed regions.  Malaria,
schistosomiasis and other such conditions do not
present the potential for lucrative returns and so are
often neglected in commercial research.
Of all the challenges facing developing nations with
respect to public health, none has garnered nearly as
much attention as the legal facet of the problem.  It has
been repeatedly argued on one side that stringent
intellectual property legislation keeps drug prices too
high and as a result makes them less accessible to those
who need them the most (3).  The other side contends
that intellectual property laws are required to foster
innovation and create reward incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to invest in risky research
and development (4).  This paper will examine the
underpinnings of globalized intellectual property law
and its effect on developing nations and make three
recommendations that seek to better implement public
health concerns into the existing legal framework.
BACKGROUND
WTO
The World Trade Organization is the body that
regulates international trade amongst its member
nations.  It is the only such organization in the world
and thus has tremendous influence over international
trade policy.  While bilateral and multilateral free trade
agreements exist and are permitted under the provisions
of the WTO, no other agreement has been as much of a
driving force behind the globalization and liberalization
of trade barriers as the set of agreements that comprise
the WTO.  The WTO allows representatives of member
countries to come together to form the agreements that
are central to the functioning of the WTO and the
expansion of global trade.  There are three such
agreements: GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade), GATS (the General Agreement on Trade in
Services) and the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights) agreement (5).  
TRIPS
The TRIPS agreement has played a central role in the
debate on providing access to essential medications to
countries of the developing world.  TRIPS is a WTO
agreement that was negotiated in the Uruguay Round of
negotiations from 1986 to 1994 by the members of the
WTO (80% of the world's nations and the vast majority
of the world's trading nations) that sets out certain rules
regarding intellectual property rights (5).  Once the
member countries agree to the provisions, it becomes an
official agreement of the WTO that must be ratified by
member country governments in their own parliaments.
The effect of this is to create a world standard of
intellectual property protection.  Agreements ratified by
the WTO set out certain minimum standards; member
countries reserve the right to go above and beyond the
provisions of the agreements as long as domestic
legislation does not controvert the conditions set out by
the WTO agreements.  
The purpose of the TRIPS agreement is to establish a
uniform set of rules across the globe that would provide
adequate standards of protection for intellectual
property and provide greater predictability and stability
in international economic relations (5).  At this point it
is important to note that the TRIPS agreement applies to
all forms of intellectual property: from copyrights to
trade secrets, however, this paper will focus on the
TRIPS agreement as it relates to patent protection; and
its impact on the accessibility of medications.  The
regulation of intellectual property rights has not always
been of primary importance in the international arena.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the
proliferation of high-technology devices, and the means
to reproduce them at low relative cost, has made it
essential to preserve an environment that encourages
innovation.  Industries that invested heavily in research
and development, such as the information technology
industry, were seeing their work pirated by other
companies and sold for a fraction of the price offered by
the inventors.  This created an environment that was
more profitable to "second-movers" as opposed to first-
movers1 and thus heavily discouraged innovation.
Before the enactment of the TRIPS agreement,
international intellectual property rights were governed
by the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial
Property which was first drafted in 1883.  It was widely
recognized in economic and commercial circles that the
Paris Convention was inadequate to address modern
issues of concern in industries such as information
technology and biotechnology: there were few rules
dealing with patents, no minimum period of patent
protection, and no mention of the exclusive rights of
patent-holders.  The TRIPS agreement was the modern-
day solution to this problem; it took, as its foundation,
the provisions of the Paris Convention and the majority
of the provisions of the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.  To this
foundation, the TRIPS agreement added several otherTRIPS Agreement and Public Health 154 Vol. 9  No. 2
specifications that addressed the inadequacies outlined
above (5).  Any nation that wanted to take part in the
World Trade Organization was obliged to amend its
intellectual property legislation to meet the guidelines
set out in the agreement, thus creating a uniform
international standard of protection for intellectual
property rights.  
The provisions of the TRIPS agreement range from
the mundane to the controversial.  Included in its terms
is a minimum period of patent protection of twenty
years from the date of filing for a patent.  Significantly,
the TRIPS agreement also invalidates the use of process
patents by declaring that patent protection on a process
extends to the product of that process.  In addition to
these provisions, the TRIPS agreement sets out two
mechanisms that deal with international public health
crises: compulsory licensing and parallel imports (5). 
Compulsory licensing
Under article 31 of the TRIPS agreement (6), the
rights of patent holders can be circumvented in certain
situations.  More specifically, member governments are
given the authority to grant a license to a party willing
to commercialize an invention protected under patent
without the consent of the patent holder.  Unless there is
a "national emergency", the proposed licensee is
required to make reasonable efforts to seek a voluntary
license (6).  If the patent holder refuses to grant a
license, a non-exclusive license can be granted by the
government.  Consequently, subject to other provisions
of the TRIPS Agreement, compulsory licensing allows
generic drug companies to manufacture patented drugs
and sell them at a fraction of the price that the patent
holders would, since only the costs of producing the
medication and not the costs of research and
development need to be recovered.  Critics of the
compulsory licensing provisions point to paragraph (f)
under the same article which specifies that compulsory
licensing must be used "predominantly for the supply of
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such
use" (6).  These critics contend that this clause makes it
exceedingly difficult for governments of developing
nations to issue compulsory licenses to quell public
health crises because it would require that the drugs be
manufactured in developing countries where little
infrastructure exists to support this ultra-sophisticated
industry (7).
Parallel importing
Parallel imports allow a developing nation to take
advantage of the common practice of differential
pricing of drugs across different countries.  For
instance, if a package of Nevirapine, a patented drug, is
being sold at $250.00 in France and at $275.00 in South
Africa, a South African company (or the government
itself) can import the drug from France and sell it at a
lower price without the authorization of the South
African patent holder.  Parallel imports effectively
allow countries to purchase patented medications at the
lowest global price.  The right to parallel import under
the TRIPS agreement is based on a fundamental legal
principle called "exhaustion" of intellectual property
rights which defines the point at which a patent holder
ceases to have exclusive rights in the context of re-sale
of its product (5).  Article 6 of the agreement states that
member countries can independently decide at which
point the exclusive rights of patent holders with respect
to re-sale are terminated, but issues of exhaustion
cannot form the basis of a dispute brought to the WTO
for resolution.  In effect, article 6 of the TRIPS
agreement allows member countries to engage in
parallel importing.  
Doha declaration on TRIPS and public health
Although these provisions were in the TRIPS
agreement since its inception, nations never interpreted
the provisions of the agreement in a manner consistent
with the promotion of public health.  Certain nations
that were subject to the TRIPS agreement would enact
legislation that maximized the protection of intellectual
property rights but ignored public health crises affecting
developing areas.  Further and perhaps even more
damaging, at the behest of the influential
pharmaceutical lobby developed nations would threaten
sanctions on countries that attempted to take advantage
of parallel importing or compulsory licensing.  For
example in 1997, the United States notoriously
threatened trade sanctions against South Africa unless
they repealed a section of the Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act which allowed
compulsory licensing and parallel importing, despite it
being TRIPS compliant (3, 8).
It was these events that drew the ire of public health
advocates worldwide.  At this point the WTO
acknowledged the weaknesses inherent in their
agreement and recognized that the TRIPS agreement
must be interpreted and applied in a manner that took
into consideration the health care crisis facing the
developing world. 
On November 14, 2001 in Doha, Qatar a historic
declaration was made by the WTO.  The member
governments agreed on an independent declaration
relating to the TRIPS agreement and its role in
alleviating public health crises worldwide (9).  There
were three primary concerns about the TRIPS
agreement that were addressed by the Doha Declaration
(5).  First, there were doubts as to whether the member
nations would interpret the TRIPS agreement in a155 2006
manner that favoured the advancement of public health.
To address these doubts, in paragraph 4 of the
Declaration, the member nations asserted the
Agreement's compatibility with public health and the
right of member nations to interpret the agreement with
the aim of improving public health crises.  
Second, concern was expressed about the pressure
being placed on developing nations to omit TRIPS
measures that favour public health from their
legislation.  To allay this concern, it is reiterated in
numerous instances throughout the Declaration that
nations have the autonomy to enact their own
legislation without influence from external actors.
Although redundant declarations without concrete steps
forward may seem inconsequential, it is customary in
international law to first build consensus on certain
principles and then eventually move nations to adopt
policies consistent with those principles (10).  
Third, and most importantly, the practicality of the
provisions on parallel importing and compulsory
licensing were questioned.  In paragraph 5 (d), it was
clarified that member nations have the right to engage in
parallel importing, in particular, without interference
from external actors.  A further concern, as previously
mentioned, was that compulsory licensing would only
be allowed if it was used to supply the authorizing
country's domestic market.  This meant that developed
nations could not authorize compulsory licenses for the
supply of medications to developing countries.  A
compulsory license could only be used to supply a
developing nation if the proposed licensed product was
manufactured in its jurisdiction (11).  The difficulty
with this situation is that developing nations rarely have
the infrastructure required to support a stable
pharmaceutical industry.  Paragraph 6 of the
Declaration (9) addresses this: 
"We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
could face difficulties in making effective use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We
instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious
solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002." 
Doha assignment 
Paragraph 6, called the Doha Assignment, was clearly
the most progressive aspect of the Doha Declaration; it
called for a revision of one of the TRIPS agreement's
greatest obstacles to access to medication.
Unfortunately, the WTO was unable to come to an
agreement by the end of 2002 (5).  
Criticism of the WTO mounted because of their
perceived complacency in dealing with a change that
would affect the lives of millions; but they finally came
through on August 30, 2003 with a consensus on how to
improve the compulsory licensing system (12).  Under
the agreement, all least developed countries2 that are
WTO members will be exempted from the requirement
of themselves producing patented drugs under
compulsory license.  Furthermore, countries that fall
outside the least developed country definition can issue
a compulsory license (if the drug is patented in its
jurisdiction) for the supply of a developing country if
that country's public health situation falls under certain
criteria:
- Evidence of a public health concern
- Evidence that the importer's pharmaceutical industry 
is non-existent or inadequate.
- Proof that the drug will be used only for public, non-
commercial purposes.
It was further stated in paragraph 11 of the agreement
that amendments to the TRIPS Agreement to reflect
these decisions would be made by June of 2004; thus
giving it full legal force at that time.3
In a press release, WTO Director-General Supachai
Panitchpakdi called this decision a "historic
agreement".  Panitchpakdi further elaborated: "It proves
once and for all that the [WTO] can handle
humanitarian as well as trade concerns.  This particular
question has been especially difficult.  The fact that
WTO members have managed to find compromise on
such a complex issue bears testimony to their goodwill."
(5)  Leaders across the developed world touted the
decision as a spectacular development in international
intellectual property law.  Kofi Annan, the UN
Secretary-General, stated that "intellectual property
protection is key to bringing forward new medicines,
vaccines and diagnostics urgently needed for the health
of the world's poorest people.  The United Nations fully
supports the TRIPS agreement - including the
safeguards incorporated within it." (13)
RECOMMENDATIONS
The TRIPS agreement is the sweet spot on the
punching bag that is the World Trade Organization.
Fairly or not, the TRIPS agreement is alleged to be a
monstrosity of modern capitalism.  Says Noam
Chomsky, a renowned academic: "There is nothing
McGill Journal of Medicine
2 Least developed country (LDC) as defined by the UN.  Of the 50
LDC's, 32 are WTO members.
3 The June deadline passed without any consensus, the deadline was
then extended to March of 2005.  The March deadline also passed
without any agreement, however on the 6th of December 2005, the
WTO finally came to a consensus on the amendment to be made to
the TRIPS Agreement.  This amendment follows the principles
agreed to on the 30th of August 2003.  Member nations have until
the 1st of December 2007 to ratify the amendment so that it can be
formally included into the TRIPS Agreement.  TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 156 Vol. 9  No. 2
liberal about [the TRIPS agreement].  It is a highly
protected system, designed to ensure that private
tyrannies, which is what corporations are, monopolize
the technology and the knowledge of the future." (14)
Dr. Zafar Mirza, Executive Coordinator of The
Network, a Pakistani health advocacy group, asks
"They are talking about harmonizing trade policies, but
nobody is saying a word about harmonizing the socio-
economic conditions of the world.  All countries are at
different stages of development, how could they be
governed by the same law?" (15)  These comments
stand in stark contrast to those quoted above by high-
profile public officials.  Why is one group so staunchly
opposed to the TRIPS agreement, while another shows
seemingly infallible support?  The second part of this
paper seeks to reconcile these two views.  
Criticism of the TRIPS agreement arises on a number
of levels.  There are those who criticize the
implementation of its provisions in sovereign countries,
there others that criticize the provisions of the TRIPS
agreement and there are still others who criticize its
very existence.  The subsequent critique of the TRIPS
agreement will be made through the lens of the
following neutral principles in order to make the
recommendations as relevant and applicable to the
current situation as possible:
- Access to essential medications is a fundamental 
human right.4 
- Intellectual property legislation has been a driving 
force behind innovation for commercial purposes.5 
- The world's primary source of novel and generic 
drugs has been and will continue to be the 
commercial pharmaceutical industry.6 
- The TRIPS agreement will not be repealed in the 
near future and will continue to shape international 
intellectual property law.7 
Access to essential medications is a fundamental
human right and as such, it trumps all other claims in
this issue.  The reason this issue is so complex and so
hotly debated is that in order to satisfy this right, the
right must be conceded.  In other words, in order to
finance the development of essential medications, the
producers of these medications must be financially
compensated from the users of the medications who, in
this case, cannot afford them.  In theory, since access to
essential medications is a fundamental human right,
those who cannot afford these medications should have
them provided at no cost or at a reasonable cost.  From
the above argument, the problem facing the TRIPS
agreement in the context of global public health is
defined: the fundamental human rights of those in the
developing world must be respected without hindering
the development of novel medications that serve to
advance the satisfaction of this right.
The following recommendations keep the above
arguments front and centre and attempt to improve the
public health situation within the framework of the
existing TRIPS agreement. 
Recommendation 1: Define the term "essential
medication" within TRIPS.
Patents can be applied to a wide variety of
technologies; from the most complex and sophisticated
piece of computer software to the most mundane hinge,
nut or bolt.  Even within the pharmaceutical industry,
products under patent vary greatly.  With this immense
variance, should a patent on a drug for AIDS be treated
in the same way as a patent on a drug for erectile
dysfunction or high cholesterol?
A wide array of drugs are developed and
manufactured by pharmaceutical companies and the
TRIPS agreement must differentiate between patents
for Viagra and patents for Efavirenz.  It is reasonable to
demand full 20-year intellectual property protection for
"chemical toys" (17) but when it comes to life-saving
essential medications certain concessions in favour of
the promotion of public health must be made.  The term
"essential medication" should be defined under the
TRIPS agreement, not in reference to a list of diseases,
as has been proposed in the past (18), but rather as a
general description of what constitutes the difference
between an essential and a non-essential drug.  Possible
criteria for inclusion into such a category would be:
4 Article 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (16)
states: Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control.
Article 28 of the Declaration further asserts:
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.
5 This claim is more or less incontrovertible; executives of the
pharmaceutical industry, officials of the UN and the WTO, NGO's
lobbying against TRIPS and other detractors wholeheartedly agree
on this principle according to all sources researched. 
6 The "commercial pharmaceutical industry" includes generic drug
companies as well as research & development based drug
companies.  Though recently a few enterprises have been receiving
publicity for their innovative approach to financing the research and
development of neglected diseases, they are exceptional cases.
Presently, the vast majority of the world's supply of drugs comes
from the commercial pharmaceutical industry.  This does not seem
likely to change in the near future.
7 This statement is irrefutable and redundant but will play an
important role in the critique.  Its function is to narrow the scope of
the critique to the provisions and implementation of the TRIPS
agreement itself and not its existence, nor factors outside of its
jurisdiction.  The idea is to make the recommendations directly
applicable to the current legal framework.157 2006
availability of alternative treatment, severity of the
disease the medication is aimed at treating, and the
capacity of the patent-holder to adequately supply
markets that demand the patented product.  For separate
definitions to be beneficial though, separate provisions
should be made where appropriate.  Ideally, two
separate sets of patent legislation would exist in
parallel; one applying to medications deemed essential
and another applying to non-essential medications. 
By creating separate categories of drugs, the TRIPS
Agreement can more properly balance intellectual
property protection of drugs with their purpose of
healing as many of the ill as possible.  Such a system
can encourage innovation by increasing the potential
rewards of a successful discovery of a non-essential
medication.  Simultaneously, access to essential
medications by patients in developing areas can be
improved by placing fewer protections on the
intellectual property behind these medications.
There is, however, one glaring problem with this
recommendation; creating a two-tiered system of
intellectual property protection, where one set of drugs
is given stronger protection than the other, will likely
drive research investment into the more strongly
protected class of drugs.  The solution to this is
surprisingly simple: because two classes of drugs are
established, additional rewards that do not interfere with
access can be implemented in the class of drugs that is
less protected.  For example, patents on essential
medications could be restricted to process patents alone;
in exchange, duration on a process patent could be
extended beyond twenty years.  Because two separate
categories of drugs are defined, product patents would
be maintained on all patentable goods other than
essential medications, including non-essential drugs.
In effect, creating separate categories of intellectual
property protection for disparate classes of drugs allows
for customized protection that can both promote
innovation and uphold the fundamental human rights of
those in need of essential medications. 
Recommendation 2: Allow process patents
Two types of patents exist: process patents and
product patents.  Process patents are those that apply to
the method of making or manufacturing an invention.
This stands in contrast to a product patent which is a
patent on the good itself (the product of the process).
Under a product patent, a particular invention is
protected regardless of the method used to manufacture
it, on the other hand, under a process patent only the
particular method for making the product is protected.
It then follows that a process patent affords its holder
less protection on its intellectual property than a product
patent.  
To implement this recommendation, paragraph (b) of
article 28.1 of the TRIPS agreement, which states the
rights of process patent holders, would need to be
amended.  This paragraph states that the rights of a
process patent holder extend to the product obtained
from the process and are not restricted simply to the
process itself, thus effectively eliminating the notion of
process patents from the TRIPS agreement (6).  
The most appealing aspect of process patents is that
they are at the very core of what capitalism represents:
competition, efficiency and profitability; yet applied in
the correct way, they can be extremely beneficial to
patients in the developing world.  Most research-based
pharmaceutical companies would likely disagree with
this view and would argue that a process patent provides
little incentive to invest in risky research because
another company can simply reverse engineer a
medication to find an alternative method of producing
the product, thus bypassing the process patent.
However, process patents in this situation can prove to
be acceptable to research-based pharmaceutical
companies and can improve the public health situation
in developing areas.  
Process patents provide a lower standard of
intellectual property protection and thus encourage
competition which in turn serves to decrease market
prices.  If a product is under a process patent, it
encourages competing companies to invest in research
to develop a method of producing the product in
question more efficiently than the current standard.
Unless the newly developed method is more efficient
and cost-effective, the developing company would not
be able to commercialize the product because the more
efficient and cheaper product would be preferred by
consumers (and third-world governments).  Hence, a
process patent inherently encourages the development
of the most efficient and cost-effective method of
producing the patented product, theoretically resulting
in lower prices.
The drawback of process patents (and the likely
reason they are barred from use under the TRIPS
agreement) is that they only allow research-based
pharmaceutical companies to maintain a patent
monopoly until a second developer finds a more
efficient way to produce the drug.  This would typically
shorten the period of patent monopoly that the
discovering company is entitled to; however it provides
other companies with an opportunity to earn increased
profits by improving on the drug in question.  In order
to make the notion of process patents more amenable to
research-based pharmaceutical companies (and thus
more agreeable to the more powerful member nations),
a few modifications must be made to this
recommendation.  First, process patents should be
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applicable only to essential medications, as described in
the first recommendation, to encourage research and
development expenditure in other drug classes and in
other technologies altogether.  Secondly, to preserve
some incentive for research in the field, certain
restrictions should be placed against the second
developer in commercializing its product in areas in
which the discovering company holds a substantial
proportion of the market.
In combining the above provisions, the result could
be a highly efficient drug discovery and manufacturing
process protected by patent, but flexible enough to
adequately supply developing areas of the world.
Recommendation 3: Compulsory licensing: an
obligation not an option.
The biggest problem with compulsory licensing, as
described in the TRIPS agreement and its amendment,
is that it is not written as a minimum standard that
nations must implement into their domestic legislation
to be TRIPS-compliant.  Rather, it is written as an
option that member nations have for implementation
into their domestic legislation.  As a result, only five
jurisdictions that have the pharmaceutical capacity to be
exporting countries under compulsory licensing have
actually made progress on implementing these
measures into their domestic legislation (18).  If the
Doha Declaration is considered to be an accurate
reflection of the sentiments of nations, provisions on
compulsory licensing must be incorporated into the
TRIPS agreement as an obligation on member nations.
At the very least, if separate classes of drugs are created,
as outlined in the first recommendation, provisions on
compulsory licensing for essential medications should
be made a requirement in order to be TRIPS-compliant.
Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement specifies the
conditions of use of compulsory licensing by member
nations.  It begins by stating "Where the law of a
Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder" (6)
in reference to compulsory licenses.  The language of
the article clearly leaves it possible for member nations
to enact domestic intellectual property legislation
without provisions for compulsory importing and yet
still be compliant with the TRIPS agreement, the Doha
Declaration and the Decision of August 30, 2003.  The
notion of compulsory licensing has very little value to
public health if the only nations that adopt it are the
ones that have no capacity to manufacture
pharmaceutical products.  Although it is true that
parallel importing is also worded to be an option rather
than an obligation, it does not pose as serious a problem
because for a country to benefit from parallel importing,
it must only amend its own domestic legislation to allow
it; it is not dependent on the cooperation of other
nations.  On the other hand, a developing nation can
only benefit from compulsory licensing if more
developed nations enact it into their own legislation.
Detractors of this recommendation may argue that
making these provisions obligatory, encroaches upon
the sovereignty of a nation; but this must be looked at in
the context of the TRIPS agreement as a whole.  The
agreement makes several provisions obligatory: patent
protection must last for at least 20 years; process
patenting is not permissible, public disclosure of the
invention is obligatory, and so on.  Making compulsory
licensing obligatory in the context of a supra-national
agreement that makes other provisions obligatory,
particularly when it is consistent with an official
declaration of the member nations, should elicit little
political opposition on these grounds.  
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it must be reiterated that the lack of
accessibility to essential medications by developing
nations is a result of a number of factors; an
unprecedented level of international collaboration and
empathy will be required to make meaningful progress
on this issue.  This paper though, focuses on the factor
that has been receiving the most attention: the WTO and
its TRIPS agreement.  The reason this facet of the
problem is emphasized in this paper is three-fold:
- Of the many factors contributing to the current 
public health crisis, none are as simple to resolve, 
relatively speaking, than amending the TRIPS 
agreement. 
- From my research, I have concluded that there are 
means that have yet to be addressed to balance the 
interests of commercial pharmaceutical enterprises 
with the human rights of patients in developing 
nations with. 
- There is reason to be optimistic about the TRIPS 
agreement.  The Doha Declaration, which affirms the
commitment of WTO members to improving public 
health in developing nations is only five years old, 
this is a very short period of time in which to expect 
sweeping changes in international law.  By lobbying 
our governments with creative yet pragmatic ideas, 
globally equitable healthcare can be a reality.
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